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Abstract
The reasons for and against composite indicators are briefly reviewed, as well as the avail‑
able theories for their construction. After noting the strong normative dimension of these 
measures—which ultimately aim to ‘tell a story’, e.g. to promote the social discovery of 
a particular phenomenon, we inquire whether a less partisan use of a composite indica‑
tor can be proposed by allowing more latitude in the framing of its construction. We thus 
explore whether a composite indicator can be built to tell ‘more than one story’ and test 
this in practical contexts. These include measures used in convergence analysis in the field 
of cohesion policies and a recent case involving the World Bank’s Doing Business Index. 
Our experiments are built to imagine different constituencies and stakeholders who agree 
on the use of evidence and of statistical information while differing on the interpretation of 
what is relevant and vital.
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1  Scope
Composite indicators have seen dramatic growth in use as well as in impact, and are 
increasingly used at face value by a plurality of actors. At the same time, academia main‑
tains an honest scepticism about these measures, tempered by methodological develop‑
ments that aim to remedy their most evident shortcomings.
True to its nature, a composite indicator is usually built to ‘tell a story’. It is thus ideally 
suited to identify and bring attention to a possibly latent phenomenon. For this, it is appre‑
ciated by ‘value entrepreneurs’.1
When used for policy, the unidirectionality of composite indicators is less desirable. In 
the context of policy analysis and negotiation, in which different options, as well as dif‑
ferent ‘ends in sight’, are relevant, composite indicators may fall short. Ideally, different 
stakeholders could confront one another, armed with different measures and indicators. 
Could the concept of composite indicators be stretched so as to accommodate these set‑
tings? Could one force it to tell ‘more than one story’?
In this contribution, we give this concept a try based on examples.
2  The Fortune of Composite Indicators
A recent search on Scopus performed in the summer of 2019 indicates growth in interest 
in composite indicators, proxied by their mention in the scientific literature. Figure 1 sug‑
gests that not only is the use of composite indicators increasing but so is the pace of their 
growth.
The ‘Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 
Social Progress’, prepared by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean‑Paul Fitoussi for the 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy (Stiglitz et al. 2009), says that the growth in the number 
of statistical indicators reflects different concurring trends: improvements in the level of 
education, increases in the complexity of modern economies, and the widespread use of 
information technology.
As discussed in Becker et al. (2017), human well‑being and progress are areas in which 
composite indicators are popular, covering themes from happiness‑adjusted income to 
environmentally adjusted income, from child development to information and communica‑
tion technology. They are also used in the analysis of innovation (Balcerzak and Pietrzak 
2017a; Dutta, Lanvin and Wunsch‑Vincent 2018; Hausken and Moxnes 2019; Żelazny and 
Pietrucha 2017), analysis of real estate markets (Małkowska and Głuszak 2016), coun‑
tries’ competitiveness (Cheba and Szopik‑Depczynska 2017; World Bank 2019; Kruk and 
Waśniewska 2017; Schwab 2019), socio‑economic development (Bartkowiak‑Bakun 2017; 
Mazziotta and Pareto 2016), the quality of institutions (Balcerzak and Pietrzak 2017b), 
sustainable development (Balcerzak and Pietrzak 2017c; Luzzati and Gucciardi 2015; 
Semenenko et al. 2019), the standard of living (Greyling and Tregenna 2017; Kuc 2017), 
well‑being (Barrington‑Leigh and Escande 2018; Chaaban et al. 2016; Peiro‑Palomino and 
Picazo‑Tadeo 2018) and many others (Aparicio and Kapelko 2019; Capecchi and Simone 
1 Value entrepreneur is a term coined by Emily Barman’s in ‘Caring Capitalism’, cited in Popp Berman 
and Hirschman 2018). Those are experts whose job is to measure social value of different measures for the 
purpose of investment, and whose choices are driven by ‘communicative goals’; a value entrepreneur might 
want to establish legitimacy, show conformity, change behaviour or justify a field.
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2019; Dinis et al. 2019; Marozzi 2015; Mann and Shideler 2015; Michener 2015; Miro and 
Piffaut 2019; Rogalska 2018). Many composite indicators target issues of sustainability. 
In this respect, an ongoing line of inquiry is to understand why these measures seem to 
have little traction, e.g. in relation to their capacity to displace established indicators such 
as gross domestic product (GDP) as measures of progress (Boulanger 2018; Popp Berman 
and Hirschman 2018). We return to these themes later in the paper.
3  Pros and Cons of Composite Indicators
An existing handbook on composite indicators (OECD‑JRC 2008) lists several pros and 
cons of these measures (Table 1).
The report by Stiglitz et  al. (2009) considers composite indexes (CIs) problematic 
because even when the weighting procedure is presented transparently, the normative 
implications of the weights are seldom spelt out or justified. Along the same lines, for Popp 
Berman and Hirschman “successful quantification projects tend to hide their assumptions”. 
The critique of CIs also feeds into the present reflection on the abuse of metrics (Muller 
2018), with the example of university ranking and similar league tables standing out as 
controversial (Saisana et al. 2011; Wilsdon 2016).
For mainstream economics—for the purpose of this paper exemplified by the World 
Bank’s economist Martin Ravallion—CIs are guilty of not being constructed on sound eco‑
nomics. Ravallion identifies two types of indices: those built on economic theory, either 
Fig. 1  Search on www.scopu s.com using as search string: TITLE‑ABS‑KEY (“composite indicator*”) OR 
TITLE‑ABS‑KEY (“composite index”) OR TITLE‑ABS‑KEY (“composite indices”)
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direct monetary aggregates or based on shadow prices2; and all others, which are dismiss‑
ively termed ‘mashup indices’—a definition that Ravallion applies to existing measures, 
such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI).
More, in general, the use of Economics as a master discipline to adjudicate the sound‑
ness of any form of knowledge has suffered, after the internal discussion in economics on 
the role of mathematics and modelling. Initiated after the models’ inability to predict the 
last recession (Mirowski 2013), this discussion gave birth to a new term, ‘mathiness’—
coined by the economist Paul Romer (2015), defined as the use of mathematics to veil 
positions which are in fact normative. The use of prices—whether real or shadow—is in 
itself fraught with the crucial normative assumption that socio‑ecological outcomes can be 
represented in monetary terms (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). Finally, doubts remain as to 
what constitutes a ‘sound economic theory’, given the present controversy in the profession 
against the prevailing economic paradigm (Reinert 2008; Rethinking Economics 2017).
Indeed, we suggest that composite indicators is a field better addressed by social scien‑
tists in general, than it is by the field of economics in particular, as we go on to discuss in 
the next session.
4  Is a Theory for Composite Indicators Possible?
Without being exhaustive, we mention here some important ingredients of a possible 
theory of CIs. To start with, the OECD‑JRC handbook (2008)offers ten recursive steps to 
build CIs, from building a theoretical framework to how to present the results, and includes 
Table 1  Pros and cons of composite indicators Source: OECD‑JRC 2008
Pros Cons
1. Can summarise complex, multi‑dimensional 
realities to support decision‑makers
2. Are easier to interpret than a battery of many 
separate indicators
3. Can assess the progress of countries over time
4. Reduce the visible size of a set of indicators 
without dropping the underlying information base
5. Thus, make it possible to include more informa‑
tion within the existing size limit
6. Place issues of country performance and progress 
at the centre of the policy arena
7. Facilitate communication with the general public 
(i.e. citizens, media) and promote accountability
8. Help to construct/underpin narratives for lay and 
literate audiences
9. Enable users to compare complex dimensions 
effectively
1. May send misleading policy messages if poorly 
constructed or misinterpreted
2. May invite simplistic policy conclusions
3. May be misused, e.g. to support the desired policy, 
if the construction process is not transparent and/or 
lacks sound statistical or conceptual principles
4. The selection of indicators and weights could be 
the subject of political dispute
5. May disguise severe failings in some dimensions 
and increase the difficulty of identifying proper 
remedial action if the construction process is not 
transparent
6. May lead to inappropriate policies if dimensions 
of performance that are difficult to measure are 
ignored
2 Economists resort to various strategies to compute costs when they are not available. For example, a 
shadow price can be estimated based on the estimated ‘willingness to pay’; in the absence of a market price, 
the value of a good or service is taken to be what people would be willing to pay for it.
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advice on how to tackle technical choices on data selection, imputation, normalization, and 
aggregation. Even a cursory glance at this list is sufficient to grasp that numerous model‑
ling assumptions are needed in these processes, not just the assignment of weights; the 
idea that a composite indicator can be made ‘objective’ should be put to rest. As men‑
tioned above, ‘telling a story’ is precisely what a ‘value entrepreneur’ wishes to do. In this 
context, the problem may not be with the non‑neutrality of a measure but, rather, with its 
purported neutrality. The production of apparently neutral scientific fact in the context of 
policy is known as ‘stealth advocacy’ (Pielke 2007), meaning that this form of advocacy 
is hidden behind a veneer of objectivity. Following Pielke, we suggest that scientists and 
CI developers be clear about their normative stances, rather than courting an impossible 
neutrality.
It is also important to note that most existing CIs suffer from technical shortcomings, 
especially when they are built using a linear combination of variables. For example, most 
indicators are built in such that the weights attached to the different variables (i) add up 
to one and (ii) reflect the importance of the variables. In fact, both (i) and (ii) are highly 
questionable, if not outright wrong. It can be proven that according to mathematical theory 
it is the sum of the squared weights which should be one (Becker et al. 2017) and that the 
actual importance of variables in a CI may deviate from its weights considerably (Paruolo 
et al. 2013). Both results owe to the theory of sensitivity analysis (Saltelli et al. 2008), a 
tool used in mathematical modelling. This theory proves that the importance of a given 
variable is given by the square of its weight divided by the sum of all squared weights, for 
the ideal case of uncorrelated and standardised variables (Saltelli et al. 2008, p. 47). For 
non‑standardised and non‑independent variables, the importance depends on the interplay 
of the relative variances and on correlation among the variables.
For Paul‑Marie Boulanger (2014), CI can be situated at the intersection of three con‑
ceptual movements. The first is associated with the democratisation of expertise (Carrozza 
2014), the idea that more knowledge needs to be brought to bear than that provided by 
experts. This is close to the concept of extended peer community advocated in post‑normal 
science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993), in which the soundness of scientific practice is not 
judged simply by the peers of a given discipline but by several disciplines, because each 
discipline offers a different viewpoint. Laypeople with a direct stake, knowledge, or interest 
in the matter at hand are also involved in the process. The OECD‑JRC handbook insists on 
the need for an indicator to be co‑developed, possibly and ideally involving the community 
of those actors (individuals, institutions, countries, or regions), which are affected by the 
measure. This process should extend to all the stages in a CI’s construction (OECD‑JRC 
2008).
The second constitutive element identified by Boulanger (2014) is CI as instrumental in 
the creation of a new public through a process of social discovery (Dewey 1938). Why are 
‘social discoveries’ needed? For Dewey, there are ‘publics’ affected by a transaction taking 
place somewhere else, who need to be made aware of a problem situation—e.g. the pollu‑
tion of an aquifer, a case of air contamination, the unintended consequences of technology, 
and so on. In his view, the “machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensi‑
fied and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences […] that the resultant public 
cannot identify and distinguish”. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck later called a society 
thus affected by a myriad of mostly invisible threats a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992 [1986]).
In general, developing an index of, say, air quality, sustainability, the rule of law, cor‑
ruption, or university performance can generate and mobilise new publics, at times produc‑
ing important policy outcomes. Several recent books on the emerging field of sociology of 
quantification reviewed in Popp Berman and Hirschman (2018) address this issue.
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The third element which can be used to shed light on CI comes from Charles Sanders 
Peirce, the father of semiotics, and his triadic conception of the sign as a structure con‑
necting three elements: the sign properly said (S), an object (O), and an ‘interpretant’ (I). 
The example reported by Boulanger (2014) is that of the African vervet monkey, which 
possesses a sophisticated repertory of vocal signs for signalling the presence of a predator, 
distinguishing a terrestrial stalker such as a leopard, an aerial raptor such as an eagle, or a 
ground predator such as a snake. In this case, the ‘object’ is the predator, the ‘sign’ is the 
cry emitted by the vervet, and the ‘interpretant’ is the collective behaviour of the monkeys 
in reaction to the cry, e.g. climbing up a tree if the predator is terrestrial. Thus a CI is not 
just a sign (a number) pointing to an issue; it also entails an interpretant, understood as the 
policy or social change desired or suggested by the proponents of the measure. The same 
Dewey (1938) made the point that any social indicator is meaningful only in the context of 
a desired end in sight.
Boulanger enriched the analysis of indicators of sustainability and their interpretants in 
a subsequent work (2018) drawing from the German sociologist and systems theorist Nik‑
las Luhmann. For Boulanger, mobilising publics with a CI is not just a matter of providing 
the ‘facts’. According to Luhmann, modern societies should be seen as functionally dif‑
ferentiated, i.e. composed of several sub‑systems, relatively independent (law, science, the 
economy, the mass media, etc.). These systems may either actively develop/use indicators 
to influence their evolution or be influenced by them when one system is observing another 
system with an indicator. The problem with sustainability is thus which system is observ‑
ing or ‘irritating’ (the word used by Luhmann) which system. Science cannot easily ‘irri‑
tate’ e.g. the economy developing a measure of progress to replace GDP, as science and 
economy follow separate codes of communication, true–false for science and gain–loss for 
the economy.
There are instead cases where the strength of indicators, their capacity to appear objec‑
tive, and their addictive character, manage to impact social systems, as evidenced by uni‑
versity league tables mentioned earlier (Saisana et al. 2011; Wilsdon 2016).
5  Frames and Quantitative Storytelling (QST)
It is a tautology that every measure of society corresponds to a frame and—according to 
Dewey—to ‘an end in sight’ as well. The use of frames in the policy discourse is a hot 
topic. For example, in the US, George Lakoff (2004, 2010) laments the liberals’ cultural 
subjugation to frames developed by conservatives. In economics, Akerlof and Shiller 
(2015)discuss how economic actors operating in a market are forced to exploit the frames 
of their consumers in order to survive. This view reverses economics’ (and Adam Smith’s) 
cherished paradigm that the composition of individual selfishness in a market produces 
a common good. The market as the best arbiter of all negotiations is at the heart of the 
prevailing orthodoxy, neoclassical economics. As mentioned, this theory is at present 
contested (Mirowski 2013; Reinert 2008; Rethinking Economics 2017). The French legal 
scholar Alan Supiot (2015) sees the neoliberal creed in markets as particularly reliant on 
quantification, in which numbers replace laws to create a world of dystopian injustice and 
dysfunction.
Frames are very much at the core of discussion on the use of evidence for policy (known 
as evidence‑based policy [EBP]). Dan Kahan, an expert in cultural cognition theory, stud‑
ies how we process new knowledge in order to reinforce our existing worldviews and 
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political orientations (Kahan et  al. 2011), so an actor’s deeper knowledge reinforces—
rather than cures—his or her polarisation.
It is thus a current refrain in EBP that facts and values cannot be always be separated, 
e.g. when social facts are brought to bear on the design of a policy (Gluckman 2017). The 
present—in our view disingenuous—brouhaha about the end of facts and the post‑truth 
society (Flood 2016) mixes somewhat uncritically conscious strategies of confusion and 
manipulation—as witnessed in the recent US elections—with the existence of a plurality 
of legitimate frames around what constitutes a problem and hence a ‘fact’ in relation to the 
problems (Saltelli and Funtowicz 2017).
In other words, one should not equate the US administration’s ‘alternate facts’ with the 
concept of ‘extended facts’, defined in the theory of post‑normal science as the product of 
an extended peer community (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). An extended fact may be a 
loss to a constituency which has been overlooked, a fact that is not part of the set of facts 
brought to bear by a regulator or by the proponent of a policy.
Quantitative storytelling (QST; Giampietro et  al. 2014; Saltelli and Giampietro 2017) 
posits that more legitimate frames and worldviews are upheld by different social actors. 
Thus, QST draws attention to the fact that economic and mathematical models used in EBP 
are often in the form of risk analyses or cost–benefit analyses. These models focus on a 
single framing of the issue under consideration. A classic example is when a monetary 
equivalent is assigned to a social or environmental good. As discussed above, in relation to 
the critique of Ravallion (2010), this implies a clear normative stance.
In the logic of QST, the deepening of the analysis corresponding to a single view of 
what the issue is—achieved by ‘mathematizing’ the problem – distracts from what could 
be alternative readings.
For Ravetz (1987) and Rayner (2012), alternative frames may represent ‘uncomfortable 
knowledge’, which is removed from the policy discourse. Lakoff (2004, 2010) suggests that 
frames may be used to generate ‘hypo‑cognition’.
Under this critical viewpoint, mathematical models—or a CI in the present context—
can be seen as a tool for ‘displacement’ (Rayner 2012). This occurs when a model or a 
ranking becomes the end instead of the means, e.g. when universities monitor and manage 
the outcome of a ranking, rather than what happens within their walls (Saisana et al. 2011). 
After stakeholders realise they are on the receiving end of a strategy of hypo‑cognition, 
their trust in the actors and institutions involved may be diminished (Saltelli and Giampi‑
etro 2017). A fundamental problem with EBP is that stronger players have access to bet‑
ter evidence, i.e. more data and indicators in the present context, and can use it strategi‑
cally (Saltelli 2018). Thus, EBP is based on a power asymmetry (Boden and Epstein 2006; 
Strassheim and Kettunen 2014).
In QST, one drops the hope that neutral, impersonal facts will prescribe a policy and 
suggests instead acknowledging ignorance, as to identify ‘clumsy solutions’ (Rayner 2012), 
which may accommodate unshared epistemological or ethical principles. Similarly, post‑
normal science suggests ‘working deliberatively within imperfections’ (van der Sluijs et al. 
2008). The solution offered by QST is to use quantification ‘via negativa’, by testing which 
of the available frames runs afoul of a quantitative or qualitative analytic check, as shown 
in the PISA example below. QST borrows from system ecology and attempts to refute the 
frames if they are based on unsound inference or violate the constraints of (Giampietro 
et al. 2014): (i) feasibility (can one afford a given policy in terms of external constraints, 
e.g. existing biophysical resources?), (ii) viability (can one afford it in the context of the 
internal constraints, governance, socio‑economic, and technological arrangements?), and 
(iii) desirability (will the relevant constituency accept it?). For example, in examining the 
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transition to a carbon‑free economy, one can test the availability of natural resources (lith‑
ium, cobalt, and other minerals needed for energy storage), whether legislation promoting 
transition is viable, and whether the transition is compatible with existing lifestyles. An 
instructive test case of QST exploring the deployment of intermittent electrical energy sup‑
ply in Germany and Spain is reported in Renner and Giampietro (2019).
Perhaps the best application of the concept of QST ante litteram is an old study of how 
European citizens perceive the existing narratives and conflicts in the adoption of geneti‑
cally modified (GMO) food and products (Marris et al. 2001). Although the prevailing nar‑
rative is that ‘GMO food is safe’ and that consumer reluctance is rooted in anti‑technology 
or anti‑science prejudice, Marris and co‑authors showed that the people interviewed did 
not care about the safety of GMO food but, rather, expressed concern about a totally differ‑
ent set of issues, including:
• who would benefit from these technologies
• why they were introduced in the first place
• whether existing regulatory authorities would be up to the task of resisting regulatory 
capture from powerful industrial incumbents.
Quantitative storytelling, like other tools for evidence appraisal, such as sensitivity anal‑
ysis (Saltelli et al. 2008), NUSAP (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; van der Sluijs et al. 2005), 
and sensitivity auditing (Saltelli et al. 2013), can be useful for gauging and possibly decon‑
structing existing measures. Thus, proposers of new CI should factor this danger in if they 
wish to anticipate criticism. They should be the first to test the relevance and robustness of 
their constructs, following the well‑known Mertonian principle of ‘organized scepticism’ 
(Merton 1973), in which scientists strive to falsify their own results and invite fellow scien‑
tists to attempt such a deconstruction.
In the present work, we apply the QST approach to the construction of a composite indi‑
cator. We consider that social convergence, with its dense web of interconnected interests, 
policies, and outcomes, offers an ideal environment for such an experiment. The Cohe‑
sion Policy and convergence issues are still being discussed in the policy arena (e.g. the 
7th Cohesion Forum, held in Brussels 26–27 June 2017; European Commission 2017a, 
b, c, d, e), as well as in the academy (Anagnostou et  al. 2015; Baddeley 2006; Balcer‑
zak and Rogalska 2016; Cosci and Mirra 2017; Furkowa and Chocholata 2017; Horridge 
and Rokicki 2017; Pietrzak and Balcerzak 2017; Próchniak and Witkowski 2016; Scheurer 
and Haase 2017; Stanickova 2017). The role of narratives linked to the Cohesion Policy is 
likely to be perceived as increasingly important for mitigating the present difficulties of the 
European project (Applebaum 2017).
6  A Previous Example of Quantitative Storytelling
Quantitative storytelling has been used in relation to the ranking of the OECD‑PISA study 
(Araújo et al. 2017; Saltelli 2017). We describe this work here, as it shows how the meth‑
odology can be used to deconstruct a measure. In the test cases of the following sections a 
constructive use of quantitative storytelling is demonstrated.
Since the publication of its first results in 2000, the Programme for International Stu‑
dent Assessment (PISA) implemented by the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation 
and Development (OECD) has been a subject of controversy. PISA has been presented 
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by some as a measure of a country’s innovation and growth potential, while others found 
these metrics—published every 3 years with considerable media amplification—irrelevant 
and potentially counter‑productive. Noticeably, the PISA dispute was the subject of a letter 
published in The Guardian newspaper and signed by several educationalists and scholars 
and of a subsequent exchange with the OECD (Meyer and Zahedi 2014; for additional ref‑
erences, see Araújo et al. 2017).
OECD‑PISA is a convenient example for discussing the importance of the issue of 
frames in policy, as well as some limitations in the concept of EBP.
For advocates of ‘evidence‑based’ or ‘informed’ policy, PISA incarnates the dispas‑
sionate, objective facts which nourish the formulation of sound policies by allowing for 
comparison across countries and possibly for the identification of good practices worth 
emulating. For opponents of this survey, the relation between PISA and economic growth 
represents a neoliberal framing of education policies within a context of globalisation 
which is perceived as unacceptable. QST showed that—while international comparability 
is desirable—more tends to be read into these ranking than the quality of evidence allows 
(Araújo et al. 2017).
According to the analysis in Araújo et al. (2017), a number of issues emerged.
(1) Over‑interpretation of PISA results: According to PISA supporters (Woessmann 2014), 
“If every EU Member State achieved an improvement of 25 points in its PISA score 
(which is what for example Germany and Poland achieved over the last decade), the 
GDP of the whole EU would increase by between 4% and 6% by 2090; such a 6% 
increase would correspond to 35 trillion Euro.”
(2) PISA scoring strongly depends upon the modelling assumption, the design of the sam‑
ple, the choice of the items (questions) included or excluded, and the number and 
typology of students sampled. Previous works reviewed in Araújo et al. (2017) showed 
that shifts in the relative position of a country were attributed to the success or failure 
of educational policies when, in fact, they were due to different compositions of the 
share of students excluded from the test.
(3) PISA ranking lacks uncertainty and sensitivity analysis. PISA just offers a summary 
and non‑conservative measure of the error of a country score.
(4) The non‑availability of the full data hampers a full analysis of the sensitivity of PISA 
scores to modelling assumptions.
(5) PISA embeds strong normative stances, foremost the fact that education is investigated 
as an input to growth.
(6) PISA may adversely affect what is taught and might run counter to our desires concern‑
ing what education should be about. It encourages focusing on the subset of educational 
topics being selected at the expense of others.
(7) In measuring what it considers ‘life skills’, PISA assumes that these skills are the same 
across countries and cultures. All societies are bound to become ‘knowledge’ societies. 
However, diversity in the curriculum being taught might be a source of country‑specific 
creativity and well‑being.
We recognise in this list many of the ‘flags’ from QST (and from sensitivity auditing as 
well; see Araújo et al. 2017), e.g. in technical shortcomings in the interpretation of analy‑
sis, its non‑transparency, the non‑desirability of the adopted narrative, and the institutional 
conflicts on whether countries or a supra‑national organisation such as the OECD should 
dictate curricula.
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While in the example just given QST was used to deconstruct a frame, in the present 
work it will be used to enrich the spectrum of frames in order to test a new style of use for 
CI.
7  First Case: Analysis of Convergence
As discussed above, social convergence offers an ideal arena for testing QST. With the 
implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, a stronger focus is placed on social 
performance and employment, in which what Europe needs is less division and more cohe‑
sion, especially now, when the European Union is struggling with Brexit, a refugee crisis, a 
multispeed union and a populist upsurge of euro‑scepticism.
8  Second Case: Doing Business Index (DBI)
The World Bank’s Doing Business Index—also known as the ease of doing business 
score—is an extremely popular CI, constructed by aggregating forty‑one component indi‑
cators over ten thematic areas (World Bank 2019):
 1. Starting a business.
 2. Dealing with construction permits.
 3. Getting electricity.
 4. Registering property.
 5. Getting credit.
 6. Protecting minority investors.
 7. Paying taxes.
 8. Trading across borders.
 9. Enforcing contracts.
 10. Resolving insolvency.
The forty‑one component indicators are first normalised according to a min–max 
scheme and then aggregated through a simple average within the thematic areas to which 
they belong and finally into the overall index. Each of the ten areas has the same weight, 
and so do the individual CIs in an area.
One‑hundred‑ninety countries are then ranked from the highest index value to the 
lowest.
A Google search on ‘world bank’ and ‘doing business index’ in July 2019 yielded as 
many as 5290 hits, while a search on Scopus with the search strings (TITLE‑ABS‑KEY 
‘world bank’ AND ‘doing business index’) resulted in fifteen documents.
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9  Methodology for the Convergence Analysis
9.1  Composite Indicators
The classical approach to constructing CIs implies the assignment of variables to a given 
pillar (based on researchers’ knowledge or experts’ opinion), then the aggregation of varia‑
bles within the pillar, and finally aggregation into a holistic CI. We follow here this popular 
approach.
Variables used in the analysis have a different impact on social performance. Stimulants are 
factors that have a positive impact on the phenomenon analysed (e.g. the employment rate), 
while destimulants have a negative impact (e.g. the infant mortality rate). In regional research, 
destimulants are often transformed to stimulants based on the inversion formula:
where xs
ijt
 is the value obtained as stimulant j in country (region) i in year t obtained from 
transforming the original destimulant xijt (the superscript s stands for stimulant), xijt is the 
value of destimulant j in country (region) i in year t.
The inversion formula is the simplest transformation method, and it gives all the diagnostic 
variables the same interpretation in the sense of their impact on the phenomenon analysed, i.e. 
the higher the value, the better in the optic of the index.
After this transformation all variables are normalised according to the formula:
where min xij2005 is the minimum value of variable j in 2005. max xij2005 is the maximum 
value of variable j in 2005.
This normalisation method enables the results to be compared and their dynamics to be 
analysed by providing a fixed reference point (Pawełek 2008). In this paper, we assume that 
each dimension is equally important, so the CI is calculated as:
where CIit is the composite indicator describing social performance in country (region) i in 
year t, ziqt is the composite indicator in country (region) i calculated for variables included 
in group q in year t, p is the number of groups.
The value of ziqt is calculated as the mean average of all variables in each dimension. In this 
case, the higher the CI value is, the better for the phenomenon analysed.
9.2  Measuring Convergence
In a convergence analysis of EU Cohesion Policy, several measures are customarily employed: 
sigma convergence, delta convergence, gamma convergence, and beta convergence.
The sigma convergence concept measures gaps among time series by examining whether 
cross‑sectional variation (measured by either standard deviation, coefficient of variation, Gini 
index, or any other dispersion measure) decreases over time, as would be anticipated if two 
(1)xsijt =
1
xijt
(i = 1,… , n; j = 1,…m; t = 1,… , k)
(2)x�ijt =
xs
ijt
− min xij2005
max xij2005 − min xij2005
(i = 1,… , n; j = 1,…m; t = 1,… , k)
(3)CIit =
1
p
p∑
q=1
ziqt(i = 1,… , n;t = 1,… , k)
 M. Kuc-Czarnecka et al.
1 3
series converged (Kong et  al. 2019). To investigate the existence of a sigma‑convergence 
trend, regression is usually used:
where Vt is the coefficient of variation in the year t.
The following set of hypotheses was tested:
H0  V1 = V2 = Vt no sigma convergence or divergence,
H1  V1 > V2 the existence of sigma convergence,
H1a  V1 < V2 the existence of sigma divergence
where V1 is the coefficient of variation in a given year, V2 is the coefficient of variation in the 
next year.
If the estimated value of parameter 훼1 turns out to be negative and statistically significant, 
then sigma convergence is taking place, and diversity among the objects analysed is decreas‑
ing. In the case of a positive sign, sigma divergence occurs, i.e. diversity among entries is 
accelerating (Barro and Sala‑i‑Martin 1999). In some case studies, a simple plot which shows 
a tendency of cross‑sectional variance to decrease over time is taken as evidence in favour of 
sigma convergence (Tsionas 2002). This concept is widely used in policy literature (i.e. Euro‑
pean Commission 2014, 2016).
Gamma convergence is a concept proposed by Boyle and McCarthy (1997). It requires an 
examination of the change in the ranking of countries. A simple measure that captures the 
change in rankings is Kendall’s index of rank concordance, calculated as:
where C is the number of concordant pairs of countries, D is the number of discordant 
pairs of countries, n is the number of observations (countries).
Two observations are called concording if the two members of one observation are larger 
than the respective members of the other observation. Two observations are said to be discord‑
ing if the two members of one observation are in opposite order to the respective members of 
the other observation (Kendall 1938).
If τ is closer to zero, than changes within the distribution are higher, and gamma conver‑
gence occurs, in the so‑called overtaking effect. The advantage of this approach is the ability 
to capture dynamics and mobility among objects (Boyle and McCarthy 1997; Holzinger et al. 
2011). Gamma convergence is usually based on a comparison of the linear ordering of analys‑
ing observations (countries, regions) based on the CI’s vale. Usually it is the first and the last 
period of the analysis, that is taken into consideration. If Kendall tau is statistically insignifi‑
cant or negative, one can say that gamma convergence occurs and the overtake effect can be 
observed.
A less known concept, which is nonetheless important policy‑wise, is delta convergence. 
This concept was proposed by Heichel et  al. (2005) and focused on decreasing distance 
towards an exemplary model, or a frontrunner object. Delta convergence can be measured by 
the Euclidean distance from the top performer:
where di is the distance of country i from the frontrunner, max xijt is the frontrunner.
(4)Vt = 훼0 + 훼1t + 휀t
(5)휏 =
C − D
n(n − 1)
(6)di =
√∑(
xijt − max xijt
)2
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If the sum of distances from the frontrunner is decreasing, that suggest that objects are 
converging. Otherwise, divergence patterns can be observed.
where Df  is the sum of distances.
The following set of hypotheses was tested:
H0  Df1 = Df2 = Df  no delta convergence or divergence,
H1  Df1 > Df2 the existence of delta convergence,
H1a  Df1 < Df2 the existence of delta divergence.
In the European Union, cohesion policy sigma and delta convergence are more desirable 
than beta convergence, as policymakers and the general public are also interested in reduc‑
ing the disparities, not pure growth per se (Eurofound 2018; European Commission 2015). 
Because of this fact, beta convergence is not discussed in this paper.
10  Quantitative Storytelling on the Convergence Test Case
We focused on convergence at a national scale, allowing the composition of the index to 
vary. Different narratives are associated with different measures of convergence. As men‑
tioned in the previous section, sigma convergence concerns a reduction in the disparities 
among countries, gamma convergence seeks changes in the distribution, and delta conver‑
gence corresponds to reducing the distance from the frontrunner.
Here, we test QST in the context of CI to investigate the existence of social convergence 
among EU countries in 2005–2017. Therefore, for the sake of illustration we introduce 
a set of new CIs, constructed by using the 24 variables that are in the European Pillar of 
Social Rights. Six variables describe governance and fairness, and six variables are related 
to health care. The data come from the European Pillar of Social Rights, Eurostat, the 
World Health Organization, Eurostat, and national statistical offices. In the case of missing 
data, we used an imputation procedure based on multiple regression (James et al. 2017).
In our research, we assumed the existence of four different stakeholder groups. Each 
group has a different point of view about which dimensions should be included in the CI. 
The starting point in our analysis is the set of variables in the European Pillar of Social 
Rights, grouped by category (Table 2). These variables are the choice of stakeholder no. 1 
(see Table 3). Stakeholder no. 2 agrees with the first that those three categories are impor‑
tant, but from her point of view, a ‘social Europe’ should include measures of govern‑
ance and fairness. A third stakeholder thinks that governance is not relevant in social con‑
vergence analysis and that the functioning of health care should be investigated instead. 
Finally, a fourth stakeholder argues that for an exhaustive social convergence analysis, and 
all previously mentioned dimensions should be included (see Table 2).
Table 3 lists the variables included in each dimension. CI values were calculated using 
Eq. (3). Those values were the basis for estimating sigma convergence from Eq. (4) using 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The results are in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that sigma convergence occurs for stakeholders nos. 1 and 2. By con‑
trast, stakeholder no. 3 sees more variation among countries. In addition, the diver‑
gence among the member states is increasing (positive 휶1 ) for stakeholders no. 3 and 4; 
(7)Df = 훼0 + 훼1t + 휀t
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therefore, it can be assumed that sigma divergence occurs. We recall that stakeholders 3 
and 4 are those who included the functioning of health care dimensions.
The coefficient of variation in 2005 for different stakeholders ranges from 0.27 (stake‑
holder no. 3) to 0.32 (Stakeholder no. 1 and 2; see Fig. 2). Hence, different stakeholders 
may perceive the overall spread among the member states differently, depending on the 
relevance of social performance dimensions. During the financial crisis (2008–2010), 
divergence patterns were observed, no matter which components were used to build the 
CI. This proves that country differences in challenging economic conditions are grow‑
ing. In 2014 and afterwards, a significant increase in the value of the coefficient of vari‑
ation can be observed for stakeholders nos. 3 and 4, which is once again connected 
Table 4  OLS estimations of 
sigma convergence (Eq. (4)) for 
different stakeholders
p‑values are in brackets
α0 α1 R2
Stakeholder no. 1 0.3491 (< 0.001) − 0.0055 (0.0255) 0.3773
Stakeholder no. 2 0.3305 (< 0.001) − 0.0026 (0.0289) 0.3645
Stakeholder no. 3 0.2313 (< 0.001) 0.0132 (0.0050) 0.5363
Stakeholder no. 4 0.2585 (< 0.001) 0.0086 (0.0020) 0.5972
Fig. 2  The dynamic of the coefficient of variation
Table 5  Values of Kendall–tau 
coefficient and corresponding 
p‑values
τ P value
Stakeholder no. 1 0.6182 < 0.001
Stakeholder no. 2 0.6980 < 0.001
Stakeholder no. 3 0.5556 < 0.001
Stakeholder no. 4 0.5954 < 0.001
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with the unfavourable situation in the health‑care system. Also, the perspective of stake‑
holder no. 2, including governance and fairness, indicates the occurrence of greater 
variation than stakeholder no. 1, who takes only social performance into consideration.
Table 5 presents the results on gamma convergence. For each stakeholder, the Kendall‑
tau measure is positive and statistically significant, which implies no evidence of gamma 
convergence. In other words, the ranking of countries is relatively stable, and no overlap‑
ping effects are observed.
Figure 3 presents the countries’ aggregated distance from the best performer. As in the 
case of sigma convergence, a definite increase in the distance was also observed during 
the economic crisis. For all stakeholder, the sum of Euclidean distances was bigger at the 
end of the period analysed than in the initial year. The increase in distance for stakeholders 
nos. 1 and 2 was around 35%, whereas it was 125% for stakeholders 3 and 4. Thus Fig. 3 
indicates that delta convergence did not occur over the analysed period. The findings on 
hypothesis testing for delta convergence, Eq. (7), are presented in the Table 6.
Analysing data presented in Table 6 we are not able to say whether the delta‑conver‑
gence occurs or not. First of all, the parameter is statistically insignificant, and, more 
importantly, the coefficient of determination is extremely low. A comparatively well‑fitted 
model can be obtained for stakeholders nos. 3 and 4, for whom the estimated parameter 
Fig. 3  The dynamic of standardised Euclidean distance from the frontrunner
Table 6  OLS estimation for 
Eq. (7) for 27 European Union 
countries
The p‑value is in brackets
α0 α1 R2
Stakeholder no. 1 18.8463 (< 0.001) 0.0335 (0.9100) 0.0012
Stakeholder no. 2 16.8488 (< 0.001) 0.0342 (0.8791) 0.0021
Stakeholder no. 3 13.0741 (0.0028) 1.4868 (0.0054) 0.5206
Stakeholder no. 4 12.6301 (0.0007) 1.1961 (0.0051) 0.5255
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was statistically significant and positive, indicating that delta divergence occurs. Therefore, 
it can be argued that adding variables related to health care affected the overall results. 
The significant and increasing differences among EU countries in health‑care organisation, 
well‑being and poverty, and disease prevention may have an impact on an already weak‑
ened European Union. Furthermore, they substantiate the notion of a union with many 
speeds.
While the European project experiences an objective moment of difficulty, it is notice‑
able that situation appears better when the ‘official set’ of convergence measure is used 
(stakeholder no.1) than when other sets of variables meeting different concerns (fairness, 
health) are included. The tension between the official set and the antagonist sets discussed 
here is artificial, but these situations exist in practice. One illuminating example is a con‑
troversy between the French representatives of the trade unions (and their militant experts) 
and the statistical office INSEE about how to measure poverty in France. Bernard Sujo‑
bert recounts this episode in the volume Stat‑activisme: comment lutter avec the nombres 
(Bruno et al. 2014). Noticeable in this story – involving a new statistical measure known as 
 BIP40—is that the initial resistance of the official statisticians was successfully softened by 
a combination statistical activism, dialogue, and mediatic echo of the new proposed meas‑
ure. What motivated the stat‑activists was precisely the mismatch between what they per‑
ceived as a worsening of poverty for segments of the population and the reassuring mes‑
sage conveyed by the official measures of INSEE.
11  Quantitative Storytelling for the Doing Business Index
The DBI has been far from uncontroversial. Conceived as a measure of competitiveness, 
the methodology for its assessment has changed repeatedly over time. New component 
indicators have been introduced, some topics were removed, and other methodological 
changes were made. For instance, the 2016 version of the index introduced new component 
indicators, including the concept of building quality index (in the ‘dealing with construc‑
tion permits’ topic), reliability of supply, and transparency of tariff index (‘getting electric‑
ity’ topic). Possibly the most prominent variation in the DBI assessment is the exclusion of 
the ‘employing workers’ thematic area from the 2011 edition onwards. As regards meth‑
odological changes, the component indicator ‘total tax and contribution rate’ (previously 
‘total tax rate’) is aggregated in a non‑linear fashion in the ‘paying taxes’ area from 2015. 
The quantity is elevated to the power of 0.8 before the min–max normalisation.
These changes in the DBI assessment resulted in variations in ranking for some coun‑
tries from one edition to the next. For instance, Chile’s performance ranking deteriorated 
over the two presidencies of Michelle Bachelet. It has been alleged that this was a deliber‑
ate manoeuvre to discredit the left‑wing Bachelet against the mandates of the conservative 
Sebastián Piñera.
When questioned about this result, the then–World Bank chief economist, Paul Romer, 
objected that the index trend was not the result of any deteriorating performance by Chile; 
rather, it resulted from the introduction of new component indicators (Talley 2018). In a 
later blog post, Romer (2018b) clarified that this was not a deliberate move by the World 
Bank and provided an independent analysis of the data. Thus, Romer argued that the con‑
troversy was caused merely by insufficient clarity in the World Bank’s communication. The 
loss of credibility caused by this episode, however, might be one of the reasons why Romer 
resigned from his duties as World Bank chief economist (Lawder and Wroughton 2018; 
 M. Kuc-Czarnecka et al.
1 3
Zumbrun 2018). Romer is not an ordinary economist; in the past he demonstrated consid‑
erable intellectual openness by starting a discussion on the misuse of mathematical models 
in economics, coining the already mentioned neologism ‘mathiness’ (2015) to signify the 
use of mathematics to veil normative stances in growth models.
Romer (2018a) applied QST to DBI in an attempt to test the robustness of his collabora‑
tors’ calculations. He did so by performing a new assessment, in which he included all the 
CIs available over the period of the study.
His objective was to remove the effect of introducing new variables in the computation 
of the DBI assessment methodology, thus producing more stable and comparable rankings 
over the years.
Romer implemented a Jupyter notebook3 with his calculations, which has been made 
publicly available on his GitHub repository.4 One of his main findings was that picking 
only the set of twenty‑four component indicators available for the entire period 2014‑2018 
would have produced a less volatile ranking for Chile (Fig. 4). Romer ultimately encour‑
aged his blog readers to repeat his analysis and evaluate longer trends, rather than ranking 
annual variations.
The prominence of the World Bank and the notoriety of the DBI led various countries 
to implement economic policies that would target an increase in their DBI score. The fore‑
word to the 2019 edition states ‘What gets measured gets done’ and notes: ‘Since its launch 
in 2003, Doing Business has inspired more than 3500 reforms in the 10 areas of business 
regulation measured by the report’.
Developing countries are particularly keen to pursue DBI‑inspired reforms and to 
receive the approval of the World Bank, which conceived the DBI for this very purpose. 
Yet this did not happen without controversy: criticisms of multiple aspects of the DBI were 
raised in many quarters.
For opponents of so‑called governance by numbers, the metric strategy pursued by 
international organizations has led to a deplorable erosion of the law and human condition 
(Supiot 2015). Berg and Cazes (2007) criticise the political perspective of the DBI in rela‑
tion to the framework of labour laws, disputing the narrative whereby countries with less 
Fig. 4  Chile’s world ranking 
according to its DBI score over 
the period 2014–2018, depending 
on the accounting methodology 
(DBI reports vs. Paul Romer’s 
QST). The charts show four 
points for each method, rather 
than five because the figures for 
2014 and 2015 overlap
3 https ://githu b.com/paulr omer1 49/DB‑Calcs /blob/maste r/DB‑Calcs .ipynb .
4 https ://githu b.com/paulr omer1 49.
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protective labour laws had a higher ranking. According to the authors of the study, a coun‑
try would be incentivised by the DBI to foster labour market deregulation, whereas the eco‑
nomic benefits on the ground of such a framework would be questionable. Other authors 
disputed the normative perspective of some of the component indicators on the country’s 
employment performance. For instance, Benjamin et al. (2010) claim that the component 
indicators do not adequately map onto the state of labour regulation. These authors sug‑
gested integrating the assessment performed by the World Bank with other aspects, such as 
‘microlegislation, labour market institutions and juridical interpretation’. The controversy 
around the deregulation of labour laws contributed to the removal of this thematic area 
from the DBI assessment from the 2011 edition. From this version onwards, the working 
employment area is discussed as a separate annexe, in which the dominant narrative is to 
seek a balance between worker protection and flexibility.
More technical criticism of the DBI comes from Høyland et  al. (2012) and Pinheiro‑
Alves and Zambujal‑Oliveira (2012). The former argue that the index completely neglects 
uncertainty and, with it, possible volatility in the country rankings. The latter argue that the 
selection of variables in the DBI may be misleading, as several of them do not contribute 
to variations in the score in the thematic area that they are part of. That is, they are ‘silent’ 
in the sense discussed in (Paruolo et al. 2013; Saisana et al. 2005). This may convey inad‑
equate information to investors who are scrutinising the countries’ DBI performance.
The effect of the different DBI component indicators is discussed by Schueth (2011) 
who analysed the performance of Georgia according to the DBI and the Global Competi‑
tiveness Index (GCI). Georgia’s position in the DBI rank has been rising, moving from 
100/155 in 2006 to 11/183 in 2010. In the 2019 edition of the DBI report, Georgia ranked 
sixth out of 190. By contrast, Georgia’s GCI ranking languished: the country was reported 
to be 85th out of 125 in 2006, and it remained at 90/133 in 2009. Even in the most recent 
version of the GCI report, Georgia still ranks 66th out of 140. Schueth (2011) argues that 
this extreme discrepancy in performance can be ascribed to how the different sets of vari‑
ables included in the indicators capture economic phenomena. This could also be seen as 
QST setting, whereby a Georgian policy maker who wishes to attract investment to the 
country would showcase the rapid improvement in Georgia’s DBI ranking; an opposition 
leader might lament Georgia languishing GCI ranking as a proof of the ineffectiveness of 
the country’s policies on competitiveness and business friendliness. Doing‑business con‑
troversies lend themselves naturally to QST experiments.
12  Conclusions
The reflections given in this paper in the context of CIs are likely to apply to a much larger 
set of quantification practices. As Popp Berman and Hirschman (2018) inquire, in the age 
of algorithms and indicators, “what qualities are specific to rankings, or indicators, or mod‑
els, or algorithms?” In particular, the misuse of metrics, statistical inference, mathematical 
modelling, and algorithms exhibit some common patterns (Saltelli 2019, 2020).
The solution offered here is by no means unique. For example, to address the predica‑
ment of using fragile mathematical instruments to measure soft concepts, some authors 
have suggested resorting to the theory of partially ordered sets. This approach offers a syn‑
thesis of multidimensional indicator systems in which the original variables are not aggre‑
gated, and the individuals being ranked (e.g. countries or regions or districts; see an exam‑
ple in Beycan et al. (2019); Carlsen and Bruggemann (2014, 2017)) are partially ordered 
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graphically. This procedure removes the design and modelling choices needed for a CI, 
such as weights, normalisation, and an aggregation scheme. Partial ordering is thus, by 
design, more robust than CIs.
We focus here on the present generation of CIs, briefly reviewing the existing debates 
and offering some constructive criticism. In particular, we modify the philosophy of CIs 
from ‘analysis cum advocacy’ to ‘analysis with multiple storytelling’. In other words, we 
examine a situation in which different stakeholders agree on the importance of evidence 
and the need to use statistical data while disagreeing on what ‘the end in sight’ should be, 
as exemplified in the real world by the  BIP40 story (Bruno et al. 2014).
Cohesion policy offers a convenient battleground for testing this methodology, as it is 
clear that multiple definitions of cohesion are possible and desirable, at a moment when a 
clear overall EU narrative seems elusive (Applebaum 2017).
Should measures of fairness or health be part of the portfolio of policies to be targeted 
by a cohesion policy? Clearly, depending on the answers to these questions, different diag‑
noses can be produced as to the state and the progress of cohesion.
Unsurprisingly, EU countries differ more upon a dimension which we loosely call fair‑
ness and which includes corruption, political functioning, stability and accountability, reg‑
ulatory quality, and the rule of law.
EU countries become more equal when health care is included, but at the same time, 
this equality is eroded by the recent onset of a divergence trend.
The case of the Doing Business shows that, in practice, some sort of multiple‑frame 
analysis—what we call quantitative storytelling—is already taking place under pressure 
from stakeholders. This contributed to variation in the structure of the underpinning the‑
matic areas in the DBI over the years. The most prominent of them is the exclusion from 
the 2011 edition of the index of a controversial thematic area such as ‘employing workers’. 
The primary role played by stakeholders is also reflected by the fact the DBI is simultane‑
ously a measure and a target proposed to developing countries. For this reason, the danger 
of the Goodhart (or Campbell) Law—that when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to 
be a good measure as ‘players’ start adapting to it (Muller 2018), has been contrasted by 
scholars and stakeholders alike, signalling a mismatch between the measure and the desir‑
ability of the resulting policy.
13  Software and Data
Software and data used for the present work can be retrieved at the GitHub repository https 
://githu b.com/Confa reneo class ico/Quant itati ve_story telli ng_makin g_compo site_indic ator
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